Book: "The Troops Need You, America: Six Ways to Help them Win" Author: USAF Major Eric Egland (Reserve) Publisher: The Jericho Group
America is at war, which means much more than just military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. All Americans are at war - or at least we should be - here at home, doing everything we can to help win the struggle with international terrorism.
In the book, Egland describes in great detail how you can do your part, explaining along the way what must be done both in the field and here at home to win the war of jihad against democracy.
Egland has served in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and he was stationed in Saudi Arabia during the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. When it comes to the Middle East and the war on terrorism, he knows what he's talking about.
Egland is a reservist who has focused on Iraq and Afghanistan since early 2004. He tells the story of a broad array of combat innovators he was honored to work with while patrolling with units on the ground, field testing new technology, designing new training scenarios, and briefing senior leaders in Kabul, Baghdad, and Washington D.C.
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This extraordinary book, however, is not based on Egland's ideas and theories. It is a compilation of ideas, strategies and tactics ranging from privates to generals to other military and defense experts.
"'The Troops Need You, America' is a plan from the troops," Egland explains. "It represents the Internet-enabled collaboration of hundreds of people around the world, from troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, to experts in training, technology, and tactics, citizen activists, and active and retired senior military officers and government officials.
"Most Americans believe that their ability to support the
troops is limited to prayers, bumper stickers and care packages," he adds. "They want to do more, but do not know how else to meaningfully support the troops."
The purpose of his book, Egland explains, "is to accelerate the pace of positive change in Iraq by presenting a plan for success that comes from the troops. The plan identifies the six operational changes we need to make and offers specific actions for civilians to take to create the change that will help the troops finish the mission."
Egland writes that Americans "wonder about progress in Iraq, and if it is worth the price we are paying in the lives and limbs of our brave service members." He suggests that in "a better security environment with far fewer casualties, public patience for mission completion would increase."
That means paying attention to what the author calls "the number one threat to security and the number one cause of U.S. and Iraqi casualties" - the networks that attack our troops with improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, which cause the vast majority of U.S. and allied coalition casualties.
Egland explains that the two main categories are roadside bombs that target passing vehicles, and suicide IEDs where attackers wear explosive vests or drive cars laden with explosives.
"Media reports show that IEDs cause the vast majority of casualties," he writes. "The actual impact of IEDs is even greater because casualties from gunfire or rocket-propelled grenades often occur at sites where a roadside bomb was used to bait our troops to respond and expose themselves in a pre-selected kill zone of our enemy's choosing."
Those networks that use IEDs, he insists, should be the primary focus of our troops in combat, while the local security forces focus on sectarian violence. Defeating IED networks, he writes, "is actually vital to the overall strategic success of several pillars of U.S. national security policy, including the global war on Islamic extremism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"The IED is the only weapon they use both effectively and consistently," Egland writes. "In essence, the dependence on IEDs makes jihadists and insurgents a one-trick pony, though quite good at the one trick. Take away the trick, and the media bark becomes much worse than the explosive bite."
He explains the many steps required to reach this goal, and shows how the American people can help achieve it.
Among his targets is the idea that "bigness is best" - the Pentagon's habit of preferring high-tech products from the major defense contractors while ignoring better and less expensive equipment from smaller, but brilliantly innovative manufacturers.
Egland illustrates this point by recounting the saga of three computer programs meant to predict future insurgent actions based on their past performances.
The Pentagon opted for two expensive programs which failed to work in the field. A third, inexpensive program ignored by the brass, was used by a battalion intelligence officer who had used it in his civilian job and believed it would do the job in combat. It worked.
In another shocking story, Egland recalls how a unit's request to use an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAD) in its combat operations was denied because it was needed elsewhere.
Elsewhere, it turned out, was hovering above the same unit on rooftops in an effort to spy on the men and catch them not wearing their heavy protective clothing due to the searing heat.
The book emphasizes how to counteract such problems as the insurgent's brilliant use of the media to sap the will of the American people. It also highlights the need for the American people to organize groups to buy and send supplies, such as lasers, to the troops requesting them, giving funds to troop commanders in the field to use as on the ground circumstances demand.
"We must abandon the peacetime, business-as-usual mentality that pervades much of the government at home and in Iraq," Egland explains. "A telling example occurred when Army bureaucrats denied a request from the troops for powerful handheld green lasers that were being used at checkpoints to safely warn oncoming traffic. The status quo remains, resulting in innocent Iraqis being killed in legally-justifiable but horrific escalation-of-force incidents that emotionally
scar our troops and spawn local hatred that helps to fuel the
insurgency."
It took parents back home to buy and send the lasers to their sons and husbands, Egland reveals.
Much has been written about General David Petraeus's plan to win in Iraq. Eglund has also designed a plan, and it is needed if the general's strategy is to succeed.
"The U.S. must win in Iraq, while consolidating our gains in Afghanistan," Egland writes. "Victory can be achieved sooner if the American people organize and call for the government and military to do what it cannot do itself: make six key course corrections.
"There is time to get this done, and there is plenty of
need," he continued. "While many debated how soon the troops might come
home in the 2006 election season, the number of troops has
actually been increasing since the president announced a
surge of over 20,000 U.S. forces. Clearly we are at a critical
juncture in Iraq.
"If those additional forces are led to have an offensive mindset that hunts the enemy, those troops will help achieve victory," Egland writes. "On the other hand, if business as usual continues, and the additional troops are out conducting more presence patrols, more troops simply means more targets."
Americans can begin to enter the fray and help win it by reading this invaluable book and following Eglund's suggestions.
A kindly reminder may help spark some action: Uncle Sam needs you!