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Expert: Jihadists Can Infiltrate Dubai Ports World Dave Eberhart, NewsMax.com A terrorism expert has revealed a chilling scenario of just how Jihadists could deeply penetrate Dubai Ports World, the embattled United Arab Emirates company that is poised to take over operations at many key U.S. maritime terminals.
Dr. Walid Phares, terrorism and Mideast expert and senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, told MSNBC: "In the Dubai World ports agreement, the issue is about how successful can the Jihadists be in penetrating the company in the U.A.E. If they can infiltrate it - which is most likely - they will be able to infiltrate the U.S."
"If anything has to be done, it is in this regard. The rest is politics," the former professor of Middle East Studies and Ethnic and Religious Conflict at Florida Atlantic University concluded in the brief televised interview.
Phares, who conducts briefings to the State, Justice, Defense and Homeland Security Departments, the U.S. Congress, the European Union, and the United Nations Security Council, has been - like many experts these days - focused on the national security implications of the recent purchase of London-based Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. by DP World, a state-owned business headquartered in the U.A.E.
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The author of "Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America," Phares is a busy man as he hustles to feed a media hungry for any and all details of the secretive deal that has launched the Bush administration into its latest PR skirmish lines. When NewsMax contacted his offices to get more details from the harried expert, it was referred to an exhaustive essay on the subject that the author churned out late last night.
After denigrating the politicizing of the issue, Dr. Phares emphasizes in his essay the deep danger of penetration:
"First, the enemy will penetrate from the U.A.E. end, aided by Salafi or even Khumeinist sympathizers. This first line of defense could be breached by hiring elements to form a network inside the company, or subcontracted ‘hostile' entities in the future.
"Second, while moving inside the layers of the management the ‘net' could then hire elements coming from the American side. If we project that Jihadists are operating inside the U.S., a U.A.E. company managing six main U.S. ports would be a first rate opportunity for them to ‘connect.'
"Hence, one can project that once a network installs itself inside the corporation, it would be able to recruit U.S. citizens and residents [who are] sympathizers with or part of the movement. A bridge would thus be established between the outside cells and the inside cells through a perfectly legitimate outlet."
As to the enemy's end-game in the expert's sobering scenario, Phares writes: "Action would come once the bridge is operational. It could develop into multiple directions. General intelligence and spying in the U.S. is only one possibility. Storing material in these sensitive areas is two. Learning about the security systems in these ports from the administrative end is three. Disrupting national security operations is four. The deeper the layers, the wider possibilities would open to the Jihadists. But the initial ‘hole' is what allows the chain to develop."
As to ethnic identity and the race issue: "The backers of the deal stated that it would be unfair for the U.S. government to reject the deal with the U.A.E. just because it is an Arab country. This argument doesn't hold. The issue is not the ethnic identity of the U.A.E., but the capability of terrorists to penetrate the U.S. system by penetrating a particular country."
As a case-in-point, Phares compares and contrasts U.A.E. with another Arab country - Jordan:
"Well, had the deal been with Jordan, the grade could have been different. The Hashemite government is now ideologically engaged against al-Qaida. The King rejected the Takfir doctrine, a key weapon in the Jihadists mobilization. Dubai is still silent on it."
In another key point about Jordan being a different creature from the UAE, the author notes that the United States is targeted by two powers - the al-Qaida-led Salafists and the Iran controlled Khumeinists. Both, he opines, are omnipresent in the U.A.E.
"The Salafists have manifested their presence before and after 9/11," Phares writes. "Reports about sympathies are abundant. U.A.E. efforts to curb their influence were indeed been noticeable, but no major state-led offensive has waged a systematic campaign as in Jordan."
As to U.A.E. being a key ally to the United States in the war on terrorism: "[C]atching al-Qaida operatives from time to time shouldn't provide the vital security clearance to U.S. hinterland's access points."
On this point, Phares further remarks about the vital differences between the present holder of the contract, the United Kingdom, and the future ports operator, the U.A.E.: "[T]he United Kingdom's strategic commitments and integration in the War on Terror are more advanced than those of the U.A.E."
The author goes on to list his reasons why London's position is higher:
Phares concludes that the issue is not about London being a better ally in the war on terror than Dubai. It is about the deployment of Salafists organizations and Khumeinist agencies within that federation of monarchies.
On trusting an ostensible ally: "[I]n terms of ‘trust' Washington can and should travel the extra mile with its allies, European or other, to translate the alliance into tangible steps. But that doesn't support the argument that these countries, any country with radical networks conditions, would be granted capabilities that could jeopardize U.S. national security, even though indirectly."
Phares notes that while individual al-Qaida supporters have indeed been sought after by the U.A.E., Jihadism wasn't outright outlawed. On the other hand, he writes, "the Emirates have been infiltrated by Iranian services for decades. These two streams are the reason for why assigning U.S. ports management is a matter of national security."
While refraining from comment on the quality and quantity of the pre-deal vetting process by the U.S. government, the author does have an opinion on what should have been the focus of major inquiry:
"The issue at hand was to determine - with good faith - if the U.S. can or cannot strike at the deeper layers of future Jihad in partnership with the U.A.E. In short, is Dubai as a government ready to uproot that threat from its end, as Jordan, the United Kingdom or Australia does, or had it not reached that capability and intention yet?"
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