Stop Coddling Putin
Dr. Alexandr Nemets
Thursday, Sept. 26, 2002
In the autumn of 1997, a group of leading Republicans in Congress published a
document analyzing Russian internal and external policy and directly
appealing to the Clinton administration to "Stop coddling Yeltsin!" In particular,
they stressed that "the ruling class in Russia is composed of ‘regular
criminals,’ criminalized businessmen and criminalized officials."
Now, evidently, it is time to ask the current administration to "Stop coddling
Putin!"
The "internal reasons" are the same as in 1997; in addition, Russia has been transformed
into a country controlled by the FSB/KGB – i.e., mafia of mafias.
However, "foreign policy factors" are now incomparably greater.
Major Events of June-September 2002
Beginning in September 2001, Vladimir Putin has played "America’s ally" –
at least for those in American political and business circles who are inclined to
self-delusion and look at Russia through rose-colored glasses.
However, now again we see that Moscow has returned to its old ways. The author
proposes two major reasons for this return:
- In the beginning of June, Putin twice held talks with Jiang Zemin, in
Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan) and Petersburg; almost simultaneously, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited China. In August, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov held
very important negotiations in Beijing with Chinese supreme leaders. This
resulted in significant upgrading of the Chinese-Russian alliance and – naturally
– in the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations.
- The dramatic rise of oil prices, in April-September 2002, gave Kremlin new
chances for survival. Instantly, the behavior of Moscow became – in the typical New
Russian manner – extremely impudent.
More concretely:
1) Russia greatly expanded military supplies to China; in January-August
2002, the two countries concluded weapons supply contracts – including the most
advanced missile destroyers, diesel-electric submarines, SU-30 fighters,
air-defense missile systems and military helicopters – for an estimated $7 billion. This figure doesn’t include new agreements for the development
of a new generation of space, aircraft and nuclear technology.
Without a doubt, these new contracts could have, as soon as 2005-2006,
very bad consequences for Taiwan, Japan and U.S. troops stationed in East Asia
and the Western Pacific.
2) At the end of July and the beginning of August, Russia and Iran reached an
agreement prescribing (a) rapid finalization of the construction of Iran’s first nuclear station
in Bushehr, (b) construction of six more nuclear reactors, with
very heavy assistance from the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy (Minatom), in
Iran.
According to Western experts, this "peaceful cooperation" greatly facilitates
development of Iran’s program of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin and Minatom
ignored the protests of the U.S. administration.
3) In mid-August, Moscow and Baghdad reached preliminary agreement on unprecedented large-scale economic cooperation – about $40 billion. After the agreement, Moscow took a hard line, adamantly opposing any military action against Iraq.
On Sept. 15-21, President Bush called Putin several times and held
talks in the White House with "two Ivanovs" (Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov) soliciting them for support against
Iraq, with no results. Mildly speaking, this was very unpleasant.
4) During August and the first half of September, Russia’s Defense Ministry and
Foreign Ministry made a series of tough anti-Georgian statements, using as a
pretext "the presence of Chechen terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge" (a small valley
in Georgia bordering Russia). In the beginning of September, Russian bombers
made a strike in Georgian territory.
And on Sept. 11, Putin himself threatened Georgia with a heavy military strike if the Georgian government didn’t meet Russia’s demands. Again, Washington protested, again with
no results.
The REAL Reason
By the way, almost nobody knows the REAL reason for Moscow’s saber-rattling.
On Sept. 16, after five years of negotiations, British Petroleum and
other prominent Western companies started construction of an oil pipeline from Baku (capital of
Azerbaijan) to Ceihan (a seaport on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey). When this project is finished in 2006, a large flow of oil will go from
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, bypassing Russia, to the world market.
This is
absolutely unacceptable to Moscow, which intends to control – directly or
indirectly – the huge hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian basin and all of
Central Asia. That’s why Moscow intends to strike Georgia, completely
destabilizing the situation in this troubled republic, and undermine the Baku-Ceihan
project.
In addition, the Kremlin continues to support, to the maximum degree possible, all
the anti-American regimes and movements around the world – in
North Korea, Palestine, Venezuela, etc.
Major Conclusions
Let’s look at the major goals of the Putin regime, which are now more evident
than ever.
1) Keep oil prices, both short- and mid-term, at the present
high level or even increase them above $30 per barrel.
Generally, that’s why Russia is against any military action against Iraq:
If Saddam were "out," the situation in the Middle East would become more stable and
world oil prices would return to $20-25 per barrel. This is unacceptable to
Moscow!
This also explains the "neutral" (de facto supporting Arafat and Palestinian
extremists) position of Moscow in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict
also inflates world oil prices.
One could counter that Russia has increased its oil exports, thus improving the
world oil balance, and recently even sent several hundred thousand tons of
oil directly to the U.S.
But Iraq sends, also directly to the U.S., 15 million tons of oil annually. Does this mean
anything?
2) Maximize export of weapons and dual technologies, including nuclear ones.
These exports – to China, the "axis of evil" and other "countries of concern" – are
measured in many billions of dollars. And the U.S. has to increase greatly its
military and home-security expenses – just to properly respond to the new threats.
Every dollar of Russian export of weapon and dual technology results in several dollars of additional expenses for America!
3) In all ways, Moscow crosses the U.S. and its close
allies. And this is not occasional. Gleb Pavlovsky and other Putin strategists don’t hide the fact that the Kremlin is interested in the geopolitical defeat of
America, the diminishing of its global role and, as a result, the recovery of
Russia’s "old glory," up to retaining the superpower status of the USSR.
Who will dare deny this evident fact now?
There is a term in geopolitics: "ontological [basic] enemy." The ontological enemies of America are limited officially now to the "axis of evil." But what about the Putin regime?
Brief Recommendations
1) It is necessary to recognize, as soon as possible, that Putin’s regime is no
ally of America, and that the U.S. will get nothing except new troubles in
this "alliance" with Putin. Let’s "get real” – enough of illusions!
2) America should prepare to respond in the toughest way possible if Putin attacks
Georgia. This aggression, if it takes place, should result in the crushing
defeat of Putin’s regime.
3) One could say, "This will help the Communist opposition in Russia."
The recent events – the governor elections in the Krasnoyarsk region, the vote in the Russian Duma over the Referendum law, etc. – show that Communist and nationalist
opposition in Russia is extremely weak or even irrelevant. Moreover, this
so-called opposition is merely a tool Putin uses to scare the West and to
get new financial and political concessions from Western countries.
However, there IS a real opposition to Moscow – in Russia’s peripheral
regions. And this opposition should eventually become an object of great
interest and attention.
Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."
Read more on this subject in related Hot Topics:
China/Taiwan
Russia