Charles R. Smith
Thursday, Sept. 12, 2002

According to the GAO, "vulnerabilities in the Dept. of Commerce's deemed export control system could help China and other countries of concern improve their military capabilities."

"Key vulnerabilities in the licensing process could help countries of concern advance their military capabilities by obtaining sensitive dual-use technology," noted the GAO report.

The GAO noted that China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria obtained licenses for the export of controlled U.S. technology. However, according to the report, "in fiscal year 2001 China accounted for over 70% of the 822 export licenses approved by the Commerce Department."

The GAO noted that the Commerce Department rejected only three licenses in 2001. The dual-use technology under Commerce's control includes "technologies associated with certain nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment; chemicals, microorganisms, and toxins, materials processing, electronics; computers; telecommunications and information security; lasers and sensors; navigation and avionics; marine systems and propulsion systems and space vehicles.

"Most of the approved licenses allowed foreign nationals from countries of concern to work with advanced computer, electronic or telecommunication and information security technologies," noted the GAO report.

Commerce Can't Track Export Cases

"Commerce could not readily track the disposition of the cases referred to field offices for follow-up because it lacks a system for doing so," noted the GAO.

"According to senior Commerce officials, Commerce staff do not regularly visit firms to determine whether these conditions are being implemented because of competing priorities, resource constraints, and inherent difficulties in enforcing several conditions.

For example, they asserted that their staff (1) does not have the technical expertise to determine if a foreign national has helped design semiconductors that exceed a certain technology threshold and (2) cannot monitor intangible technology transfers, such as those that may occur in a foreign national's conversations with fellow employees."

"Commerce's deemed export licensing system does not provide adequate assurance that U.S. national security interests are properly protected," concluded the GAO.

Commerce Has Poor Track Record

The poor performance at the Commerce Department comes as no real shock to this reporter. Commerce officials have a long history of not being able to tell the difference between military personnel and civilians when it comes to the export of advanced U.S. technology.

In 1998, the Commerce Department denied access to all China-gate documents, citing national security, on the grounds that it could "neither confirm nor deny" their existence. In response, this reporter filed suit in federal court, located in Richmond, Va., seeking the withheld information.

U.S. Attorney Joan Evans, a Clinton administration Department of Justice lawyer, told federal judge Robert Payne that the "people" Commerce Secretary Ron Brown had meetings with in Beijing were simply civilian "commissioners" from communist China. According to Ms. Evans, the Commerce Department could withhold documents on these meetings because of commercial privacy.

In response, I gave Judge Payne the name, rank and photos of the so-called Chinese civilians, all dressed as generals in the bright green uniform of the People's Liberation Army.

To say that Judge Payne was angry is an understatement. He was furious. Judge Payne promptly awarded me the case and ordered the Clinton administration to release over 1,000 pages of documents on the meetings with Chinese military officials.

Powers Came From Clinton Executive Orders

The Commerce Department did not obtain control over many dual-use technology items by the democratic process in Congress. Instead, President Bill Clinton used his magic pen to simply transfer authority over items such as supercomputers from the Defense Department to the poorly equipped Commerce officials.

The transfer also allowed U.S. computer makers to sell hundreds of advanced systems directly to weapons labs inside China, Russia, India and Pakistan.

According to U.S. Naval Institute defense analyst Norman Friedman, "The Chinese obtained the computer programs [codes] Los Alamos uses to simulate what happens inside an exploding nuclear warhead. The software is exactly what a designer of an advanced weapon would need."

"Softened" Clinton-led export regulations, according to Friedman, "made it possible for the Chinese to buy 600 super-computers on which to run that software. Thus, the Chinese have transformed their weapons development capability in a very few years."

If any single event in the 1990s assisted several impoverished nations to join the nuclear weapons club, it was President Clinton's signature loosening export controls over super-computers.

Supercomputers for Chinese Nuclear Weapons Labs

The Commerce Department has frequently allowed foreign military weapons makers to obtain supercomputers. For example, William Daley's Commerce Department approved supercomputer exports to:

• The National University of Defense Technology, which helps the Chinese military design advanced weapons.

• The University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar.

• The Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and flight dynamics.

According to the Commerce documents, Yuanwang manufactures test equipment for the Lop Nor nuclear weapons facility in China.

The documents also show that the Clinton administration knew that the Chinese army operated Yuanwang. Chinese General Ding Henggao provided the proof that Yuanwang was actually a nuclear weapons lab to the Commerce Department Gen. Ding also included the names and phone numbers of the PLA officers in charge at the Chinese weapons labs.

Radiation-Hardened Chips for Russia and China

Supercomputers for nuclear weapons designs are not the only atomic export allowed by the Commerce Department. One critical element of any nuclear-tipped missile is the design and manufacture of radiation-hardened chips that can survive in the hostile environment of space and nuclear warfare. These chips are neither available on the open market nor produced in great quantity. Just the kind of technology China would need in order to modernize its military missile and command communications systems.

On Jan. 13, 1999, the Commerce Department responded to a June 1998 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information on radiation-hardened chip technology transfers to China and Russia. The Commerce response, a two-page letter, states "we issued two licenses for Russia and three for China for the export of microprocessor technology."

The Commerce Department response noted that the licenses issued included not only the export of radiation-hardened chips to Russia and China but also "non-U.S. citizens employed by U.S. firms in the U.S. to work with controlled microprocessor technology."

The response also stated: "BXA [Bureau of Export Administration] is unable to provide you with any more detailed information on these exports. Specific information on applications to export technology for microprocessor or microchips to China or Russia is being withheld ... from public disclosure unless the release of such information is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest."

The Clinton administration allowed Chinese and Russian engineers inside the U.S. to study how chips designed to withstand intense radiation are manufactured. The Chinese and Russian engineers took the technology and equipment back to Russia and China to produce their own advanced, radiation-hardened computer chips. The Commerce Department has more but will not give up the secret documents without a legal fight.

The Commerce Department has already helped China to improve its military capabilities. The successful effort by China to obtain details on U.S. microchip technology and access to super-computers was accomplished with the willing assistance of the U.S. Commerce Department.

The red intelligence windfall freed the Chinese army to finance new weapons while it modernized using advanced American technology. The legacy that President Clinton will leave for the 21st century is a modern Chinese army equipped for global war.

Read more on this subject in related Hot Topics:
China/Taiwan
Clinton Scandals

A product that might interest you:
Find out the complete details of China's and Russia's Military Buildup in "Bitter Legacy: NewsMax Reveals the Untold Story of the Clinton-Gore Years"