Dr. Alexandr Nemets
Thursday, March 14, 2002

Space Warfare New Part of Chinese Military Strategy

At the end of February 2002, it became known that Harbin Polytechnic University (in Heilongjian province, bordering northeastern Russia), jointly with the Beijing Space Robot Research Center, finished developing the advanced space robot that will soon be sent into space as a prelude to China's first manned space mission.

Experts say this marks a breakthrough in China's efforts to develop space robots to explore the lunar surface and do work outside manned spacecraft.

The robot, equipped with 96 multifunctional sensors, 12 motors and a computer, and capable of using wrenches, screwdrivers and other miscellaneous tools, puts China, in this sector of space technology, on a par with the U.S., Japan and Russia.

Simultaneously, the Chinese State Aerospace Bureau (also known as the China National Space Administration, or CNSA) said that China presently has a long-term program of "far space" exploration, including the following major stages:

1. Launching humans into space (in 2003-2004), becoming the third nation, after the U.S. and Russia, to do so.

2. Constructing the Chinese orbital space station (in 2006-2010).
3. Exploring the moon (by 2010 or earlier).

4. Actively participating in the international exploration of Mars (in 2011-2015).

These launches will include up to three unmanned tests of Shenzhou ('Magic Vessel') spacecraft, as part of the manned spacecraft launching program.

This program, also known as the "921 project" (so named because of its official beginning in January 1992), is based to a very significant degree on Russian technology and, to a lesser degree, on cooperation with the European Union and even Brazil.

The program took a first step forward in November 1999, when the first unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft was launched, and advanced greatly with the successful launch of a second unmanned spacecraft, Shenzhou II, which landed safely in Inner Mongolia after a seven-day, 108-orbit voyage around Earth.

Shenzhou II is almost identical to a manned spacecraft, in terms of its construction.

On March 7, Lt. Gen. Hu Shixiang, deputy director of the PLA General Armament Department (GAD, one of four major departments of China's Defense Ministry, along with General Staff, Political and Logistics departments), stated in an interview with HK media that a third unmanned spacecraft, Shenzhou III, and its booster rocket (of the Long March-2F kind) have already been sent to the launch site in western China.

This spacecraft is expected to be launched sometime in June-July 2002.

China is also planning to launch in 2002 its fourth unmanned spacecraft, said Gen. Hu, who is also the deputy commander in chief of China's manned space flight project.

Hu noted that such experimental unmanned flights will have to be conducted several more times to gain experience and ensure safety before any astronauts can be sent into space.

The first Shenzhou spaceship with a Chinese astronaut onboard could be launched as early as next year, Hu said. He added that the unmanned Shenzhou III spacecraft, to be launched in mid-2002, boasts a number of technical improvements over the previous two spacecraft.

The GAD is in charge of new weapons development in China as well as of weapons purchases for PLA needs in China and abroad. It is easy to see the close ties between the Chinese manned spacecraft program and PLA modernization.

The manned spacecraft program has the following very important military applications:

1. Manned spacecraft will be handy in coordinating the work of the Chinese – or even the Chinese-Russian – reconnaissance satellite network.

2. Manned spacecraft will improve the positioning of PLA missiles, aircraft and vessels, upgrading the precision level of PLA missiles of all kinds.

3. Manned spacecraft could, in close coordination with high-ranking PLA staff, execute high-level command and control functions for, say, PLA elite troops engaged in military conflict around Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

Construction of the next stage, a Chinese orbital space station, will result in additional upgrading and expanding of these military functions, known as space warfare. Moreover, the PLA will "enjoy" these space warfare functions on the permanent base.

And this will be only the beginning.

In mid-February 2002, the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, quoted a report of Luan Enjie, director of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), saying that China is engaged in the development of the full range of technology needed for moon exploration.

The CNSA's ultimate goal is deep space exploration, Luan said, and exploring the moon will be a major step toward achieving this goal. Lunar exploration will allow China to ''struggle for a more important place in the world space science field and raise our deep space exploration technology to a higher standard."

This "lunar program" definitely includes military functions also.

According to the same Xinhua article, at the beginning of 2002 a group of four high-ranking scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (space tech expert Wang Xiji, etc.) submitted to the Chinese government the consultation report ''Building of China's Space-Based Infrastructure."

The report stated that "opening up outer space requires infrastructure (civilian and military) in space, much like the development of land, sea and air, which requires ground facilities such as railroads, sea ports, power stations and airports."

The space specialists also argued that China should effectively extend its three territorial claims – land, sea and air – into space, thus claiming the ''fourth territory," i.e., a large piece of outer space with all its resources.

China, they argued, already has "substantial capacity to enter, develop and exploit space."

It is possible to understand that China is ready to get its "piece of outer space" in heavy fighting – with the U.S., of course – and to deploy into space all the weapons necessary for this purpose.

This is a long-term goal, however. There is a short-term goal that is even more dangerous.

In 2000-2001, China came to the brink of serially producing and launching many dozens of comparatively cheap but sophisticated mini-satellites (between 100 kg and 1000kg), micro-satellites (between 10 kg and 100 kg) and nano-satellites (less than 10kg) annually.

Some Chinese papers – for example, the influential Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily), began reporting in 2001 about the "Chinese micro-satellite [and rocket-boosters for them] industry emerging and [rapidly] developing."

No doubts, Russia became the "premier supplier" of necessary technology for China in this sector. According to available data, since 1998 the Reshetnev Applied Mechanics Center near Krasnoyarsk, a city in Eastern Siberia, probably the leading producer of satellites in the USSR, has become the Chinese "reservoir of technology."

By the way, Eastern Siberia, along with the Russian Far East, is now entering China's "sphere of influence." It would be ridiculous to believe that Russian weapons stocks would be depleted soon, leaving China on its own.

On Jan. 23, Russian President Putin authorized a program (a detailed description of which fills 43 volumes) of advanced weapons development in Russia up to the year 2010. China would partly finance this program, including its "space segment," and use the results.

The flow of mini- and micro-satellite technology from abroad to China is not limited to Russia. In 1998, Beijing-based Qinghua University, one of China's space tech leaders, established intensive cooperation with the U.K.-based Surrey Satellite Technology Co., closely related to Surrey University in England.

A quotation from a mid-January 2002 article in the Far Eastern Economic Review describes the general PLA modernization process:

"Surrey Satellite Technology, perhaps the world's leading micro-satellite maker, has played a major role in developing China's infant micro-satellite industry with technology transferred to China through a joint venture with Beijing's elite Qinghua University. Specialists have warned that this type of technology is vitally important for the Chinese military to mount combined air and sea operations in the Taiwan Strait.

"However, 'PLA does not exist as far as Surrey is concerned – the satellite is owned by Qinghua University,' a Surrey Satellite Technology representative says. 'Still, a [significant] part of the developed satellite technology ends up in PLA.' "

Probably by 2005, China will be able to produce and launch at least 100 – or even twice as many – mini-, micro- and nano-satellites annually. At least half of them will be used by the PLA as spy satellites, military telecom satellites, positioning satellites, common and control satellites servicing PLA high-ranking command structures, anti-satellite weapons (for example, "satellite bombs," "parasite stars" attaching to the enemy's spacecraft and destroying it at a given moment).

They will provide, jointly with manned spacecraft and space warfare of other kinds, a tremendous expansion of PLA combat capacity.

Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."

Read more on this subject in related Hot Topics:
China/Taiwan
Russia

A product that might interest you:
Find out the complete details of China's and Russia's Military Buildup in "Bitter Legacy: NewsMax Reveals the Untold Story of the Clinton-Gore Years"