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Post-Nuclear Weapons Research in the United States Lev Navrozov
Whenever I have spoken of the development of post-nuclear superweapons in – no, not in Iraq, but in China – since 1986, I have heard in particular the following two reactions. (1) As I gave a one-hour interview on the development of post-nuclear superweapons in China to MNN Channel 14 of the Manhattan Time-Warner cable system on April 2, 2001, the lady technician or engineer of the program told me bitterly after the filming that it was a shame that I had given such an excellent interview with texts in Chinese and English about China. I asked her sarcastically about what country I should have made it – about Libya, Iraq or Iran? She laughed in appreciation of my sarcasm. "About our country," she said. "Don't you see that it is our bosses in Washington and in the multinationals who are after world domination and want to be able to annihilate any country that will resist, including its ability of retaliation?" "Ma'am," I responded to her furious attack. "Please do not take me for a blind 'patriot,' able only to echo the government conformity. I am a critic of civilizations. But for all my criticism, I have to concede that there is dictatorship in China, while the United States is protected against the tyranny of the political rulers, as John Stuart Mill used to phrase it in 1859. "In the United States, it is impossible for the government to put together a stupendous weapons project in peacetime and conceal it. Besides, let me recall that between 1945 and 1949, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and could establish world domination. But the United States never presented even an ultimatum to Stalin, though, incidentally, I have a copy of its draft." (2) The other reaction is expressed in a knowing wink and a cunning smile. It can be decoded thus: "You are a Russian simpleton who doesn't understand us. Of course post-nuclear superweapons are being developed in the United States, and we are far ahead of the rulers of China or anyone else. But our development of post-nuclear superweapons is a top, top secret. Oh, we are so smart, so secretive, so cunning!" As you see, the knowing wink and cunning smile say the same thing the television technician's furious speech did, except that the situation described was not an object of fury, but of tacit joy, with a knowing wink and a cunning smile. Shortly before the terrorist attack of 9/11/01 and the ensuing preoccupation with it to the exclusion of everything else, Judith Miller of the New York Times and two co-authors of hers published the book entitled "Germs," which was devoted to post-nuclear weapons research in the United States. The book was a bombshell because it was interpreted by many as having exposed the development of post-nuclear weapons, which the United States began "several years ago," contrary to the treaty of 1972 forbidding such weapons. Judith Miller, who appeared on CNN on Oct. 9, denied this. She said that the United States has been engaged in the defensive research that the treaty does not forbid. Note several dates. In 1969, President Nixon stopped all post-nuclear weapons research. Soviet Russia began its development of post-nuclear superweapons with special intensity in 1972 and in violation of the treaty of 1972. In 1992, President Yeltsin opened the giant Soviet biological superweapons project to international inspection. China founded its post-nuclear superweapons Project 863 in 1986. But it is only "several years ago" (in 1995?) that the United States began defensive research, which the treaty of 1972 never forbade. In front of me is the New York Times Internet article of Sept. 4, 2001, summarizing "Germs." Compared with the Chinese rulers' effort since 1986, the U.S. effort "in the past several years" is defensive – and pathetic. Note that the New York Times Internet six-page article does not mention China and Russia today or in the future as developers of post-nuclear weapons, but only "Iran, Iraq or Libya." Compared with these three countries, the U.S. post-nuclear weapons research is impressive, and it is not clear why the United States would attack one of the three as if they were a threat to its very existence. But one inconvenience of history is that the United States cannot choose all of its enemies – some of them may choose the United States as their enemy, contrary to the U.S.'s wishes. In 1997 the CIA decided to buy a Soviet (that is, pre-1992) "miniature bomb" or "bomblet" delivering germs. After all, post-1992 Russia has been selling enormous quantities of weapons to China and whoever pays. Why couldn't a CIA agent buy a Soviet pre-1992 bomblet? Well, he couldn't. Then the CIA decided to build a Soviet pre-1992 bomblet "to study how well it could dispense its lethal cargo." Two remarks in the New York Times article are noteworthy: (1) "The CIA device lacked a fuse and other parts that would make it a working bomb," and (2) the "mock bomb" was filled not with germs (the idea!) but with "simulants," "benign substances." You see? The CIA bomblet was just like it was in Russia before 1992, but it was not a working bomb and it was not (God forbid!) filled with germs. This would sound comical if it were not tragic. Also, these "secretive efforts" are "poorly coordinated." Not much to coordinate! In 1995, "Russian [again Russian!] scientists disclosed at a scientific conference that they hah implanted genes from Bacillus cereus, an organism that causes food poisoning, into the anthrax microbe." An account of the Russian experiment duly appeared in a scientific magazine in 1997. The Pentagon was alarmed: The U.S. soldiers were to be vaccinated against anthrax, but here was, in Russian non-secret non-military research, an anthrax hybrid against which the Pentagon vaccination was futile. The CIA has failed to obtain the Russian anthrax hybrid. So the Pentagon is re-creating it to see how it works, as well as to produce a vaccine against a germ obtained in Russian civilian research that was described at a 1995 London conference and in a generally available scientific magazine in 1997. What about the geostrategic development in China of post-nuclear superweapons able to annihilate the West, including its means of retaliation? As I have said, China is not even mentioned in the New York Times article, and the CIA and the Pentagon seem not to have heard of such horrors.
This piece is a variation on one of the themes of my book in progress: "Out of Moscow and Into New York: A Life in the Geostrategically Lobotomized West in the Age of Terrorism and Post-Nuclear Superweapons." Publishers: The 27-page Proposal and the first 130-page part of the book can be mailed to you if you apply to me (navlev@cloud9.net; tel. 001 718 796 6038).
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