Russian Danger to U.S.: Arming China

Russian Danger to U.S.: Arming China

Alexandr Nemets and Thomas Torda
Thursday, Aug. 30, 2001

New Developments in China

The Beijing military parade of Oct. 1, 1999 provided a wealth of material to foreign defense analysts, who estimated that People’s Liberation Army – or at least its 200,000-300,000 elite troops – was only 10-15 years behind world levels. The May-August 2001 large-scale PLA maneuvers on and around Dongshan Island, just off the Fujian Province coast and less than 100 miles from Taiwan, can be considered as a new PLA parade, furnishing even more valuable data on PLA development.

Chinese-language newspapers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the U.S. in mid-August published a number of reports on the latest round of these PLA maneuvers, code named "Liberation 1.” These reports indicate that the PLA exercises for the first time ever have used a military reconnaissance satellite, the two Beidou navigation/positioning satellites launched by China on Oct. 31 and Dec. 21, 2000, and the Yun-12-based airborne early warning and control system (AWACS). This system provides effective reconnaissance and surveillance of all targets within a 350-mile radius from the central Taiwan Strait. PLA surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are of especial importance here.

The main goals of these lengthy maneuvers around Dongshan Island are respectively embodied in the maneuvers’ three phases: (1) PLA training in use of high-tech weaponry; (2) simulating an attack on the Taiwan-held Penghu Islands (or Pescadores, in the central Taiwan Strait) as a prelude to an attack on Taiwan itself; and (3) resisting U.S. forces entering the Taiwan Strait. The Liberation No. 1 maneuvers (also known as Dongshan-6) of May-August have now entered the third stage.

The first stage, devoted to electronic warfare (EW), mostly involved PLA communications (signal corps) troops and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) radar troops. The second stage focused on joint operations among the PLAAF, PLA Navy (PLAN), China’s merchant marine (providing troop transports), PLA ground troops (including airborne troops), and the 2nd Artillery (China’s Strategic Missile Forces). In this stage, the best troops from several military regions were merged into a united rapid reaction force, which demonstrated capabilities in amphibious actions.

The present third stage, aimed at training to oppose any U.S. intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict, has the following specific objectives: PLAN air forces will gain access to the Pacific Ocean, PLAAF troops will gain expertise in complex maneuvers under all-weather conditions, and the 2nd Artillery troops will enhance their capability to launch ballistic and cruise missiles under any circumstances. The PLA’s new high-tech training policy is known as "Three Strikes (or Attacks) and Three Defenses.” The three strikes/attacks are against stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and armored helicopters, while the three defenses are respectively against precision strikes, EW, and reconnaissance and surveillance planes and satellites.

In the current stage, attention is focused on attacking enemy (U.S.) naval vessels. In this effort, PLAN has thrown in its "heavy artillery”: the two Russian-built Sovremennyy-class heavy destroyers, renamed Hangzhou and Fuzhou; Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia; and new-generation attack nuclear submarines, as well as less powerful Chinese-made guided missile destroyers and frigates.

The overriding task is to practice attacking and disabling U.S. aircraft carriers and Aegis-type cruisers trying to enter the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the U.S. has just had two aircraft carrier battle groups – those built around the USS Constellation and USS Carl Vinson – engaging in its own exercises not far from the area (see below). These are clearly the U.S. forces that the PLA is training to engage, if need be.

The operations during the Liberation No. 1 maneuvers in general reproduce the PLA’s schedule for operations needed in case of a military conflict around Taiwan: at first the PLA will capture the Penghu (Pescadore) Islands, and use them as a springboard for later attacks against Taiwan. These later operations would begin with ballistic missile and strategic cruise missile attacks on Taiwan, possibly followed by a naval blockade of Taiwan Island, and then by actions to resist U.S. armed forces that would then come to the aid of Taiwan.

The exercises are mainly designed to implement the PLA strategy of "defense of adjacent waters,” to expand the range of PLAN activity into the Pacific, and to develop a potential to disable – if not destroy – opposing U.S. forces. Most important, Chinese military leaders are seeking to upgrade the elite PLA troops to the level needed for "fighting future local conflicts under high-tech conditions,” to increase the use of high-tech arms in PLA inventories, to build up the PLA’s rapid reaction capability, and to rationalize the PLA troop structure.

The following advanced weapons are being fielded during these maneuvers:

(a) Russian-made weapons:

SU-27 and SU-30 fighters and Sovremennyy-class destroyers, all absent from the aforementioned Beijing military parade;

Kilo-class submarines;

A-50 AWACS aircraft, R-77 air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and Moskit (Sunburn) supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), all absent from the Beijing parade; and S-300 air-defense missiles (ADMs).

(b) Chinese-made weapons:

new attack nuclear submarines, not yet developed at the time of the Beijing parade;

J-8 II fighters;

FBC-1 "Flying Leopard” fighter-bombers;

supersonic ASCMs, absent from the Beijing parade;

Dongfeng-31 mobile solid-fuel ICBMs and Julang 2 (JL-2) submarine-launched strategic missiles, the latter absent from the Beijing parade; and tactical missiles and cruise missiles of various kinds.

One news report published by Beijing-based People’s Daily on Aug. 24 questioned, "At whom, if not China, is directed the movement of the U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups in the South China Sea?” The report notes that from Aug. 20 to 25, the Constellation’s carrier battle group paid a port visit to Hong Kong. However, just three days before arriving in port, this battle group and its sister battle group from the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson held a one-day large-scale joint military exercise in the South China Sea.

The report adds that since the time and place of the U.S. maneuvers were very sensitive, these exercises created much controversy: What was the exact content of the U.S. maneuvers, and what was the specific aim of the joint exercises? The answer given is that the core content of the exercises was how to deal with Chinese-fired low-altitude supersonic ASCMs, particularly the Russian-made Sunburn missiles designed to attack and disable aircraft carriers

An Agence France Presse (AFP) correspondent stationed in Hong Kong has sharply pointed out that while the PLA was launching a major exercise aimed at crossing the sea and seizing beaches on Dongshan Island (simulating beaches on the Pescadores), drilling for storming and occupying other islands and attacking aircraft carriers with missiles, the massive military exercise conducted by the U.S. aircraft carriers in the South China Sea was obviously intended to be a show of strength in answer to the Chinese military maneuvers.

Hong Kong-based Wen Wei Po reports that the Chinese armed forces are fully capable of keeping fixed and moving targets under surveillance on the southeast coasts and nearby waters, can track and identify medium-size and larger warships, and can keep all-weather/around-the-clock watch on larger warships, especially aircraft carriers, so as to "safeguard the unification of the country.”

Hong Kong-based Sing Tao Jih Pao reports that the PLA already has in its arsenal three kinds of weapons capable of countering the U.S. aircraft carriers: Sovremennyy-class destroyers, Kilo-class nuclear powered submarines, and Dongfeng 15 (DF-15) nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. These nuclear weapons, the newspaper states, would be used only if absolutely necessary.

The aforementioned People’s Daily article specially features the 7,000-ton Sovremennyy destroyers, each equipped with eight Moskit (NATO Sunburn) supersonic ASCMs and 44 ship-to-air missiles, forming "deadly weapons against U.S. carrier battle groups.” PLAN combat groups each consisting of one such destroyer, a Kilo submarine, Su-30 fighters, and Yun-12-based AWACS will become the main formation assigned to overcome the enemy aircraft carrier groups and to counter-attack any enemy reinforcing formations.

Finally, the report stresses that the PLA now has two Sovremennyy-class destroyers and four Kilo-class submarines, and plans to import two more such destroyers from Russia next year. By then, PLAN’s four fleets (Yellow Sea, Northern, East China Sea, and South China Sea, respectively) based on these warships will become the "strong opponents of enemy aircraft carriers” (emphasis added).

Conclusions and Predictions

There is absolutely no doubt that in August 2001 the PLA is much stronger than it was in October 1999. More than half of the advanced weapons listed earlier were absent from PLA inventories in 1999. Some of these are especially significant:

(1) New attack nuclear submarines.

As stated in a mid-August NewsMax.com article published by the present authors and devoted to PLAN modernization, even before the end of 2000 PLAN had fielded one or two new-generation, "093 project” nuclear submarines. The aforementioned newspaper reports confirm this fact: these "one or two submarines” are, indeed, on duty and participating in the Dongshan Island maneuvers.

Furthermore, according to the People’s Daily article, the PLA can acquire any weapon technology it wants from Russia. Could nuclear submarines be an exception? We do not think so. In June 2001 Rosvooruzheniye Corporation, Russia’s major arms exporter, published the following Internet advertisement: "Akula II attack nuclear submarine, project 971, price $750 million; order can be filled – from scratch – in 16 months. The submarine is equipped with 6 533-mm torpedo tubes, capable of launching Granat long-range ASCMs.”

Of course, China will be the first customer to get both Akula submarines and the 1,500-mile-range Granat ASCMs. By late 2002 PLAN will have three or four type-093 and Akula attack nuclear submarines.

Also by late 2002 these subs will be backed up by two or three type-094 strategic missile submarines. One of the above reports mentions submarine-launched JL-2 ICBMs, developed just for these submarines.

(2) Guided missile destroyers and supersonic ASCMs.

The People’s Daily article, in mentioning two additional Sovremennyy-class destroyers to be acquired by PLAN in 2002, evidently refers to two such warships mothballed by the Russian navy, about which the two sides reached agreement in October 2000. The Russian side will repair and upgrade them, and thus by late 2002 PLAN will have four Sovremennyy destroyers, which altogether could simultaneously launch 32 Moskit (Sunburn) supersonic ASCMs.

At the same time, China’s new indigenously developed and made supersonic ASCMs (mentioned above) – claimed to approach the Moskit (Sunburn) in performance – would be installed on Luhai-class and Luyang-class destroyers and probably other vessels. The U.S. Navy may thus be confronted with another weapon posing a deadly threat.

(3) By early 2001, China and Russia had agreed on shipment of four of the aforementioned A-50 AWACS systems to the PLA. Each such system – based on an IL-76 airframe and combining AWACS and command and control functions – can upgrade the combat potential of a large military group.

It is unfortunately not clear whether Russia shipped one or two A-50 AWACS to China in 2001. However, even without this advanced system, the PLA has developed an aircraft-satellite network providing effective surveillance of the future battlefield within a 375-mile radius.

Is this all? No. Per numerous agreements, much of Russia’s newly established (mid-2001) independent space forces are servicing the PLA.

It is time for a final conclusion: the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has definitely shifted in favor of the PLA. Until recently, it was supposed that such a change would take place only by 2005. The further development of this trend by late 2002 would pose serious problems to the U.S. Navy and other military forces desiring to urgently assist Taiwan during a conflict in the Strait.

The handwriting is on the wall. Wake up, America!

How Could This Happen?

It serves here to provide a quote from the authors’ book "The Russian-Chinese Alliance,” to be published by NewsMax.com in September: "According to official data, in 2001 Chinese military outlays will reach 141 billion yuan, exactly double – both nominally and in real terms – their 1996 level. Also, in 2001 the ‘multiplication factor,’ or ratio between real defense expenses and official ones, reached 3.5-4.0, while in 1996 this factor was about 2.8. Between 1996 and 2001 China’s military expenditures rose about 150% and neared 500 billion yuan annually.”

How much is this really, in current U.S. prices? In 1999-2000, experts on China’s economy took one yuan as equal in purchasing power to about 50 cents. There is definitely some difference, though not great, between the purchasing power of the "civilian yuan” and the "military yuan.” Thus, China’s real military budget for 2001, if computed in current U.S. prices, will approach or even surpass $200 billion.

Such a claim could cause certified optimists to raise their eyebrows, but we believe it is not exaggerated. In particular, tens of billions of dollars (again, in current U.S. prices) are to be spent for purchases and development of new arms – the lion’s share of these expenses forming "hidden items” in China’s defense budget.

A significant part of the funds allocated for PLA modernization is used for development and production of new naval weapons. Most critically, PLAN modernization is based on the best available technology, approaching advanced world levels – i.e., China is making great strides in leapfrogging to catch up with the world powers. For the most part, this is Russian weapon and weapon production technology, though Ukraine’s share here should not be underestimated.

In October 1999, China and Russia reached an accord on shipments of arms-related technology totaling $20 billion over the period 2000-2004. This accord was confirmed at the July 2000 summit in Beijing between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as during the visits to Moscow of Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian in January 2000 and First Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Gen. Zhang Wannian in February 2001.

Preliminary data indicate that Russian arms exports to China in 2000 increased 100 percent from their 1999 level and reached $2 billion, and in 2001 will rise at least 80 percent. In short, this mammoth contract is smoothly being fulfilled. The results are evident in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese money and Russian technology. Who will dare to say that Russia is no longer a threat?