Chinese Navy Threatens Asia

Chinese Navy Threatens Asia

Alexandr Nemets and Thomas Torda
Tuesday, Aug. 14, 2001

One would think, after the successful bid by the People’s Republic of China for the 2008 Olympics, that the world has at least seven peaceful years ahead. However, this is quite doubtful.

From May to July, tens of thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops engaged in large-scale, high-tech maneuvers on and near Dongshan Island, just off the coast of Fujian Province – maneuvers aimed at practicing for an amphibious operation against Taiwan.

On Aug. 11, 2001, the PLA entered a second stage of these maneuvers, considered the largest military exercises ever held in the PRC’s 52-year history. The announced aim of this new stage is to "simulate” an invasion of the Taiwan-controlled Penghu Islands (Pescadores), halfway between the Fujian coast and Taiwan, as the first stage of a major operation again Taiwan.

These war games involve at least 100,000 elite PLA troops from units in Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong Provinces; hundreds of fighters; dozens of naval vessels; and a good number of air defense and 2nd Artillery (Strategic Missile Troops) units.

The PLA’s best troops, equipped with the nation’s best ordnance and concentrated less than 100 miles from Taiwan, are under the command of some 300 high-ranking officers presiding over the maneuvers. The scale of these maneuvers clearly indicates that they are not routine, but rather a dress rehearsal for an attack on Taiwan.

This demonstration of Chinese military power came as Chinese President and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin cautioned the U.S. that arms sales to Taiwan were "utterly wrong" and "would be very dangerous,” adding that the PRC "can never renounce the use of force against Taiwan."

In a closed CMC meeting on Aug. 1, the PLA’s 74th anniversary, Jiang used much stronger words in regard to the U.S. and Taiwan. Still, many China watchers, including U.S. defense experts, consider all this activity as mere saber-rattling aimed at intimidation of Taiwan, and unsupported by real military capabilities. These experts love to point out the weakness and aging warships of the PLA Navy (PLAN).

'093 Project' Attack Nuclear Submarine

In late July, the two authors, while compiling a new book, "The Russian-Chinese Alliance" (to be published in September by NewsMax.com), wrote the following in regard to Chinese attack nuclear submarines (SSNs):

"As for SSNs – a critical area, since China’s five Han-class submarines are aging and considered obsolete – the Huludao Shipyard has been working on the "093 Project” SSN since 1996-97, with technology completely supplied by the St. Petersburg-based Rubin Design Bureau. In summer 1999, the first 093 submarine was launched, and in 2000 Taiwan sources revealed that the new submarine could be equipped with several Hongniao 3 (HN-3) land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), similar to Russia’s Granat/SS-N-21 model. The Chinese acquired technology for the Granat LACM, developed in the 1980s by Yekaterinburg-based Novator Design Bureau, in 1996-98. The Granat, which can carry a nuclear warhead, has a range of 2500-3000 km, and although subsonic, it is a sea-skimming type, very difficult to shoot down.

"On 19 July 2001, just 3 days after the signing of the Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a Moscow newspaper wrote that China is negotiating to buy the Granat, now deployed on Oscar II (Kursk-type) SSNs. There are two nearly completed Oscar II subs docked at the 'Sevmash' Shipyard in Severodvinsk, and would not cost Russian industry much to complete. China could easily have these subs for $2 billion, and this goes for other unfinished Russian SSNs at Komsomolsk-na-Amure Shipyard.

"By late 2002 PLAN will have at least one type 093 SSN built in China and at least one similar submarine built in Russia for China. How many Granat LACMs they carry is unknown.”

Only days later, one of the authors found in the authoritative Taiwan journal Chung-Kung Yen-chiu (PRC Research) (No. 2, 2001), in an article on the PLA in 2000, the following statement: "The PLA is engaged in construction of the ‘093 project’ attack nuclear submarines, equipped with 1600-km-range cruise missiles…. [By the end of 2000] one or two such submarines were already placed in service.”

The authors thought that they were making bold statements in their book. However, as often happens, Chinese reality can surpass the boldest estimates, and the authors have upgraded their forecast as follows: "By late 2002 PLAN will have in service at least two ‘093 Project’ SSNs built in China and 1-2 even more advanced SSNs built in Russia for China. At least one of them could be equipped with Granat/SS-N-21 cruise missiles with a range of 2500 km or more.” Of course, some may doubt the authenticity of this report. Still, this information is trustworthy enough. Indeed, the first "093 Project” SSN was launched in mid-1999, and the Rubin Design Bureau staff did its best to complete equipping of this ship by late 1999. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself visited this bureau on 23 December 1999 and spent several hours there. At that time, PLAN was a major – if not the only – customer of Rubin.

An added comment: attempts to look at official lists of PLA weaponry as published in The Military Balance and other mainstream defense references and Web sites for the latest data will prove fruitless. The PLA is quite good at hiding its best armaments, and these references – while quite adequate for gauging the overall size and shape of PLAN – are usually out of date by the time they land on the readers’ desks.

'094 Project' Strategic Missile Submarine

Let us go to another quotation from our book, this time in regards to China’s strategic-missile submarines (SSBNs):

"It was initially thought that by 2003 PLAN would get one Russian-technology-based ‘094 Project’ SSBN. However, Christmas Day 2000 reports from several East Asian sources indicate that on 15 December China test-fired new SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) from nuclear submarines in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea. CMC Deputy Chairman Gen. Zhang Wannian said that PLAN’s first two test-launches of MIRVed missiles from submarines were conducted simultaneously, and that the DF-31-II missiles successfully hit a dummy military-base target in the Taklamakan Desert of western China's Xinjiang Province. The 10,000-km-range DF-31-II is said to be able to attack five targets at once with a circular error probable (CEP) of 5 meters, although this claim sounds exaggerated.

"An even more startling report issued on 2-3 July 2001 by Hong Kong and Taiwan sources stated that ‘Beijing insiders’ had said that on 28 June, three type 094 SSBNs, stationed respectively in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea, had simultaneously launched ‘JL-21A’ SLBMs that precisely hit their target, 5000 km away in the Taklamakan Desert. The report said that China’s top leaders – President Jiang, Premier Zhu Rongji, Vice President Hu Jintao, Defense Minister Gen. Chi Haotian, and Gen. Zhang – observed this launch from a special command and control room in CMC Headquarters. The report added that the JL-21A could hold 6-8 MIRVed warheads, and that the U.S. intelligence community in March 2001 had predicted that the PLA will be capable of launching JL-21A SLBMs no earlier than 2005.

"The Beijing insiders also said that this triple launch of a JL-21A – characterized by small size, destructive power, and high precision (15-m CEP) – was a Chinese response to the U.S. NMD project, and that the PLA by 2005 intends to field six SSBNs, including type-094’s, each equipped with 12 JL-21A missiles (italics added). These SLBMs would complement a significant number of rail-mobile and road-mobile IRBMs and ICBMs to be deployed by 2005.

"Several major questions arise. How many ‘094 Project’ SSBNs did the PLA have by mid-2001? How many of them will be in service by late 2002? Exactly how many SLBMs and warheads will each such SSBN have? And what is the role of Russia? The authors know that China could not accomplish these test-launches without heavy assistance from the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant (the only Russian maker of SLBMs), as well as from Russian designers and builders of SSBNs in Severodvinsk (on the White Sea) and St. Petersburg. Finally, what of the early-September 1999 reports that Russia would sell China two old Typhoon-class SSBNs? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are very unclear. Obviously, this project(s) is much more dangerous than PLA projects in ICBMs and air-launched strategic LACMs combined.”

No new data is available on the type 094 submarine. However, as mentioned above, Chinese reality often surpasses the boldest estimates, and we forecast that by late 2002 PLAN likely will have at least two ‘094 Project’ SSBNs in service. Nor can it be excluded that some "written off” and mothballed Russian Typhoon-class SSBNs will be refitted for sale to the PRC.

New-generation Guided Missile Destroyers

In December 1999 and November 2000, PLAN respectively acquired from St. Petersburg’s Severnyy Verf (Northern Wharf) its first and second Sovremennyy-class destroyers (now renamed the Hangzhou and Fuzhou, respectively) equipped with 200-km-range supersonic Moskit (SS-N-22, NATO "Sunburn”) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). One such destroyer can simultaneously launch 8 ASCMs, each of which could take out a U.S. Navy Aegis-type destroyer, and three of which can disable a U.S. aircraft carrier. What is most unpleasant, by mid-2001 the U.S. Navy still had no weapon capable of effectively stopping this ASCM. This missile appears to be an ideal weapon against any U.S. Navy intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

As confirmed at the February 2001 session of the Sino-Russian Commission on Military-Technological Cooperation in Moscow, China has placed orders for six more Sovremennyy destroyers. It would take a long time to build these 8500-ton destroyers from scratch and install all the needed equipment; but the Russian Navy by early 2000 had mothballed 10 Sovremennyy destroyers for lack of funds. More critically, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has formed a commission charged with repairing these 10 destroyers, upgrading them up to the maximum degree, and selling them – either to China or India.

In October 2000, the Russian side agreed in principle to upgrade two used Sovremennyy-class destroyers at one of the St. Petersburg shipyards and transfer them to China. Evidently, by February 2001, the Chinese order had expanded to six used destroyers of this class.

By late 2002, China could acquire two or three more such destroyers, probably equipped with even more deadly Yakhont supersonic ASCMs. The Raduga Design Bureau in Dubna (150 km north of Moscow) had developed the Moskit missiles in 1980s, and NPO Mashinostroyeniye in Reutov (a Moscow suburb) outdid Raduga by its 1990s development of the Yakhont ASCM, with greater speed and a 300-km range. The Yakhont, which by late 2000 had become available for export, remarkably is smaller than the Moskit and uses a compact, 16-tube vertical launch system. How many supersonic ASCMs could be launched at once by China’s Sovremennyy destroyers by late 2002? Fifty, 60, or more?

In 1999, PLAN commissioned the new-generation Luhai-class guided missile destroyer, built by Dalian Shipyard in northeast China. By late 2002 PLAN will have at least two more such vessels, inferior to the Sovremennyy warships but incorporating advanced Russian technology, reportedly including Yakhont supersonic ASCMs. China has also begun building the new-generation Luyang-class guided missile heavy destroyer, generally similar to Sovremennyy-class ships and designed to provide sector air defense for the PLA’s first-generation aircraft carrier battle group, which could materialize as early as 2003-2005.

Molniya Missile Gunboat

All the warships described above belong to 20th-century technology. Let us look next at 21st-century naval armaments. During the visit of Lt. Gen. Zhang Wannian to Russia in June 1999, China and Russia signed an agreement for joint development of a large group of "21st-century weapons,” including new-generation naval vessels. In October 1999, it became known that the two sides would jointly develop and test a "stealthy missile gunboat, with a combat potential equal to 2-3 destroyers.”

Then, in early 2001 Russia began manufacturing the unique high-speed, low-observable (stealthy) Molniya missile gunboat, called a "small missile carrier of the 21st century” by foreign experts. This warship is produced mainly for export and China is its major customer. Said by experts to be unrivalled on the world arms market for the next 25 years, the Molniya is designed to destroy enemy surface ships and transport and landing vessels in coastal zones or on the open sea. This stealthy vessel carries four supersonic Moskit ASCMs and also has sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles and artillery armament. Its electronic equipment allows it to simultaneously track 15 targets and engage six of them.

The use of modern armament systems and high-speed propulsion enable this warship to control a sea area up to 5,000 square nautical miles. Its excellent sea-going qualities make it possible for the Molniya to fire its weapons in stormy weather (up to force-5 wind) and cruise safely in force-8 wind. This vessel, with a crew of 44, has a top speed of 38 knots and a cruising range of 2,400 nautical miles. Most important, the Molniya is several times cheaper than the Sovremennyy destroyer, while their combat potentials are said to be roughly comparable.

The Russian maker of the Molniya is not known for sure, but very likely it is Khabarovsk Shipyard, located near the Chinese border. This enterprise produces high-grade hydrofoil vessels for defense and civilian use and has some 10 years of experience in cooperation with China.

In June 2001, Rybinsk Shipyard (some 300 km northeast of Moscow) began producing the "export-oriented Skorpion missile craft,” equipped with Yakhont ASCMs, and – remarkably enough – claimed to be "much more advanced than the Molniya missile craft.”

The authors cautiously estimate that by late 2002 PLAN could have up to six Molniya missile gunboats, both Chinese-made and Russian-made, and that the first of them may already have entered service in the PLAN by mid-2001. Conclusions

All the projects listed above were initiated or greatly accelerated after June 1999. In the two-plus years since then, PLAN modernization has demonstrated almost vertical progress. As a result, PLAN is becoming a dangerous adversary for U.S. Navy groups in East Asia and the Western Pacific. By late 2002 – a critical moment related to the generational shift in China’s leaders – PLAN’s combat potential will clearly be much more evident. Of course, Russian sales and technological assistance are the key elements in this rapid development.

The authors would also like to touch upon a few other Sino-Russian naval projects mentioned in their forthcoming book:

PLAN’s conventional submarine fleet – about 60 on-duty vessels – will be upgraded and expanded by late 2002, mainly with the aid of Russian technology. The number of Russian-made Kilo-class and Chinese-made Super-Kilo-class "noiseless” submarines in PLAN’s Northern Fleet, East China Sea Fleet, and South China Sea Fleet will rise from five by late 2000 to at least seven by mid-2002. Over this same period, Russian ship repair plants, especially the Zvezda Plant near Vladivostok, will upgrade at least 10 Chinese Ming- and Romeo-class conventional submarines, and possibly as many as 20-25, according to reports from the mid-July 2001 Jiang-Putin summit.

Thus, by the end of 2002 PLAN will have formed a battle group – including advanced and upgraded missile destroyers, missile frigates and conventional submarines – capable of accomplishing the major tasks of any Taiwan operation: sea blockade, followed by landings on Taiwan, and prevention of any U.S. Navy intervention on the side of Taiwan’s Armed Forces.

Western experts love to point out that PLAN lacks amphibious transports for moving PLA troops across the Taiwan Strait. The point is that amphibious assaults (according to PLA strategists) are only the third stage of a Taiwan operation, after the air/sea blockade (first stage) and IRBM shower (second stage). When all or most of Taiwan’s heavy weapons are wiped out and U.S. troops are interdicted hundreds of miles from the island, who will prevent the PLA from crossing the strait on transport vessels of all kinds – military and civilian? Finally, let us not forget about the Russian navy, especially its Pacific Fleet, whose role under the auspicious new environment of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation could be sinister enough.

While in Sevastopol on July 29, President Putin signed Russia's new naval doctrine, which calls for a Russian fleet to be present in all the world's oceans and creates a new maritime collegium within the government to oversee fleet operations. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov stressed that the doctrine is destined to become a cornerstone of Russia's geopolitical strategy. Meanwhile, speaking at the ceremony on July 29 marking Russian Navy Day in Vladivostok, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said he will do "everything he can to restore the Russian Pacific Fleet" to its former glory, from its current sorry state.