Christopher Ruddy
Tuesday, March 27, 2001

In the April edition of the Atlantic Monthly, Richard Allen, President Reagan's National Security Adviser, released transcripts of tape recordings he made in the White House situation room during those hours of crisis.

The story about Allen's recordings has been picked up widely by the press – and the focus has been the actions of President Reagan's secretary of state, Gen. Alexander Haig.

Haig's actions that day have been criticized by many, largely because he entered the White House press room and said, "Constitutionally, gentlemen, you have the president, the vice president and the secretary of state, in that order, and should the president decide he wants to transfer the helm to the vice president, he will do so. As of now, I am in control here, in the White House, pending the return of the vice president and in close touch with him."

Recent news reports about the behind-the-scenes tape recordings seem to buttress claims Haig was exercising authority he did not have.

Despite the press claims, I read the verbatim transcripts provided to the Atlantic Monthly and know some of the details of Gen. Haig's version of events.

In fact, a review of the tape transcripts vindicates Haig and the actions he took that day.

Allen himself paints a worrisome picture in those tense moments after the White House learned of the attempt on President Reagan's life:

All we knew in the first hour was that the President had been shot. We had virtually no information about the assailant or his motives, or about whether he had acted alone. Vice President Bush was in the air over Texas. (I remember vividly the image of Haig, in a trench coat, shouting over a bad connection, "George, it's Al ... turn around ... turn around!") Bush was on his way back, but he had no means of secure voice communications from his aircraft. The first assessments by the Pentagon revealed that more Soviet submarines than usual were off the East Coast.

Let's remember that this was the height of the Cold War. Russia had its whole nuclear arsenal pointed at the United States, ready to fire.

The president had just been shot and the vice president was not in Washington. He was in fact in the air, unable to make secure communications.

The tapes show vividly that Haig was trying to make the national security team and the Cabinet members present consider all the available information, to avoid panic and to avoid doing anything that might panic the Russians. He was also interested in making sure the rest of the world understood that the U.S. government continued to function without worry.

Haig, as secretary of state, was the most senior member of the Cabinet, a fact defined by tradition and that the secretary of state is the first Cabinet member in presidential succession.

Haig was also quite capable, having served as President Nixon's chief of staff and having had a distinguished military career that included being Supreme Commander of NATO.

It was clear from the tapes that Haig understood that all U.S. actions were being monitored, by both friends and foes.

He also understood that a presidential assassination is nothing to take lightly.

Several Russian spies who have defected, for example, have warned that Russian war plans call for the assassination of the president and other American leaders before a full-scale attack. Col. Lunev, the highest-ranking Soviet military spy ever to defect, has also made this claim. (Col. Lunev writes for NewsMax.com.)

If Haig had a foil that day in the Situation Room, it was Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense.

It should be remembered that Weinberger had only been on the job for just over two months. He had no real experience in national security matters, having previously served in President Nixon's Cabinet as head of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

In the middle of this confusion, wasn't it wise that Haig assumed leadership in the White House and asked the right questions?

The tapes show significant discussions about the military's state of alert. Weinberger assured Haig that he had not raised the alert status, though he had made preparations to do so.

As discussions continued in the Situation Room, the deputy press secretary, Larry Speakes, was observed on national television.

As Allen recalls, "Asked who was running the government, Speakes responded, 'I cannot answer that question at this time.' "

Allen continued: "Haig, alarmed, came to the communications center and took me by the arm, and we moved toward the stairs to the main floor of the White House. Because I had been on the phone, I was unaware of what Speakes had said."

It was then, and in the context of Speakes' comments, that Haig made the statements he would later be so criticized for making.

Haig also told the White House press – and the rest of the world – that the U.S. military had not raised its alert status.

When Haig returned to the Situation Room he discovered that Weinberger, on his own initiative and without consultation, had decided to increase the alert status. Weinberger denied to Haig that it was an increase of the nation's nuclear alert or Defcon status.

But Haig, an old Pentagon hand, knew that Weinberger had increased the Defcon status. During a moment of crisis, without discussion or consultation with the vice president or any other Cabinet member, Weinberger had ordered SAC bomber pilots to enter their cockpits and prepare for takeoff – a very high state of alert.

Rather than sending a signal of strength, Haig feared that Weinberger's move would have the effect of fueling confusion and possible panic in the Russians. And had Haig not just told the Russians and other nations there was no change in alert status?

It is well known that the Russians have long monitored plane activity at the SAC bases. How would the Russians interpret these mixed signals?

A review of the transcript and facts indicates that while no one behaved perfectly during these moments of crisis, Haig acted reasonably and took deliberate steps to assure that a solid chain of command existed and that informed steps were taken.

Perhaps Weinberger was justified in raising the alert, but such a decision should have been made in consultation with Haig and the others, if for no other reason than to insure that Haig and others could provide accurate information about U.S. actions and intentions during the crisis.

Obviously, some colleagues chafed under Haig's leadership during the aftermath of the assassination attempt. So be it. He still did the right thing at that moment.

Read the excerpts from the transcript of the White House Situation Room on the day President Reagan was shot.