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'Scarecrow': Chinese and Russian Cooperation With North Korea
Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Wednesday, Dec. 26, 2001
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang have been almost frozen as the "democratic new Russia" has demonstrated its disdain for and negligence toward the "last hard-line Communist regime."

In 1992-98 North Korean relations with China, its last formal ally, also stalled at a low level. Chinese aid to devastated and starving North Korea has been limited to donations of several hundred thousand tons of oil products and grain annually.

Prominent American sinologist Dr. Robert Scalapino (from the University of California at Berkeley) stated in 1992, soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul: "China has, on the Korean peninsula, the unloved legal wife [North Korea] and the beloved concubine [South Korea]."

Indeed, as early as 1992, trade volume between China and South Korea was at least five times that between China and North Korea. In 1998, Chinese-South Korean trade surpassed $21 billion, while Sino-North Korean trade fell to a miserable $413 million. This latter figure included Chinese exports valued at $355 million, of which about $300 million was, in effect, economic assistance to Pyongyang.

In July 1994, just after the death of Supreme Leader Kim Il Song, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping sent a high-ranking "private envoy" (a member of Communist Party of China's Central Committee) to new Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Il with a "secret letter" containing an urgent recommendation: "Begin reforms as soon as possible!" The letter was ignored and Sino-North Korean relations remained at a standstill for several more years.

However, even during this period North Korean companies purchased from the rich Chinese electronics and machinery markets some key assemblies and spare parts needed for development and production of conventional and strategic nuclear arms. North Korea's development and August 31, 1998, test-launch of the Taepodong strategic missile, with a range of at least 3,000 miles, probably would have been impossible without Chinese indirect assistance of this kind.

Upgrading of Sino-North Korean ties began in the second half of 1999 and dramatically escalated in 2000-2001. This process is characterized by exchanges of visits between the two sides' top leaders and significant expansion of Chinese assistance of all kind, including military-technological aid.

As a result, North Korea has acquired new capabilities in development and production of the most dangerous weapons – short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and bioweapons. North Korea has exported some of these arms to Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Syria and Libya – directly or indirectly supporting terrorist movements and groups.

Reportedly, Pyongyang has even managed to find some ways to provide missile technology to Saddam's regime.

It should be emphasized that Beijing precisely coordinates with Moscow its policy and assistance toward North Korea. Thus, upgraded Beijing-Pyongyang ties in effect coincide with upgraded Moscow-Pyongyang ties.

Following are some recent major events characterizing Chinese and Russian relations with North Korea:

  • In October 1999, chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff, Lt. Gen. Fu Quanyou, visited North Korea and vigorously promoted PLA ties with the Korean People's Army.

  • In February 2000 in Pyongyang, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed a "Russian-North Korean Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbor Relations and Cooperation." In reality, this meant the spread of the emerging Sino-Russian alliance to North Korea. As a result, in the second half of 1999 and the first half of 2000, North Korea intensified its buildup of military capabilities, particularly the development of long-range missiles. North Korean deliveries of missile technology also expanded to include Iran, Syria, Libya and even Egypt.

  • In late May 2000, North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Il paid a secret visit to Beijing, thus pulling Pyongyang out of its decade-long self-isolation.

  • In June 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea and with Kim Jong-Il concluded a series of pacts on modernization of military and economic facilities built earlier in North Korea with Soviet aid. At the same time, the two countries agreed to coordinate their policies toward the U.S., Japan and South Korea. These agreements have been appreciated and hailed in Beijing.

  • In the latter half of 2000, Chinese and Russian assistance became substantial factors in the acceleration of North Korea's ballistic missile program as well as its programs to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

  • In April 2001 – during the tense crisis in Sino-U.S. relations over the collision of a Chinese fighter (lost in the sea) with a U.S. reconnaissance plane (forced to land on Hainan Island and subsequently occupied by the Chinese) – Pyongyang officially stated that it will launch attacks on the U.S. (or at least against U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan) if America and Japan go ahead with plans to construct an East Asian theater missile defense (TMD) system or irritate North Korea in any other way.

    One week later, in Moscow, North Korean Defense Minister Kim Il-Chon signed a series of Russian-arms-related agreements – first of all, on Russian deliveries of fighter aircraft to the Korean People's Army and Russian assistance in the modernization of North Korea's defense industry. Again, these agreements were hailed in Beijing.

  • In early July 2001, Chinese parliament Deputy Chairman Jiang Chunyun visited North Korea in what the media called "the first visit of a Chinese high-ranking official in many years" and further upgraded ties between the two nations in all areas. Some 10 days later, during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow to sign the Sino-Russian Good Neighbor Treaty, the two sides once more coordinated their policies toward North Korea.

    From this point on, North Korea can be considered as a "smart tool" of China and Russia in Northeast Asia. Beijing uses the North Korean tool to put pressure on South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The epochal visit of Kim Jong-Il to Russia in August 2001 confirmed and enhanced this "scarecrow" role for the Pyongyang regime.

    Beijing and Moscow, with the active assistance of their Pyongyang "scarecrow," have spared no efforts to "engage" South Korea and to remove it from the U.S. sphere of influence.

  • Jiang Zemin's visit to North Korea on Sept. 3-5, 2001, focused on North Korea's role in stabilizing the Korean peninsula. At the same moment, Beijing media published articles calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. This coincided with a new Russian proposal to expand the Trans-Siberian Railway to Pyongyang and Seoul, as well as to construct a pipeline from the natural gas deposits in the Irkutsk Region of Eastern Siberia to South Korea, via North Korean territory.

  • During the last months of 2001, North Korea – evidently with Beijing's and Moscow's blessings – redoubled its efforts toward development of chemical and biological warfare. This was accompanied by a new "anti-imperialist" propaganda campaign in the Pyongyang media.

Without doubt, by the end of 2001, the Pyongyang regime has become a useful ally of both China and Russia in Northeast Asia, as well as a smart middleman in supplying very dangerous "asymmetric technologies" (chemical and biological weapon technologies)" and short-to-intermediate-range ballistic missiles to rogue countries of the Middle East.

In effect, North Korea has become a "department store" for these nations of concern and for terrorist movements interested in acquiring missile and chemical-biological warfare technologies.

North Korea's development of nuclear arms is also proceeding apace. Simultaneously, China and Russia are guaranteeing the safety of the Pyongyang regime against possible retaliatory strikes by U.S. or Japanese forces.

Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is a consultant to the American Foreign Policy Council. He is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."

Dr. Thomas J. Torda has been a Chinese linguist specializing in science and technology with FBIS, and a Chinese/Russian defense technology consultant with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Read more on this subject in related Hot Topics:

China/Taiwan
Middle East
North Korea
Russia
War on Terrorism

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