Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Wednesday, Nov. 14, 2001

According to U.S. mainstream media, the period since Sept. 11 has been characterized by an unprecedented strengthening of U.S.-Russian ties and cooperation.

A "great leap forward" resulted from the Putin-Bush summit in Shanghai, and something of this kind is expected to be accomplished during Russian President Putin's trip to the U.S. on Nov. 13-17.

This will supposedly result in an accelerated integration of Russia into Western society. But is this really so?

Putin Appeases 'Internal Opposition'

Indeed, while preparing for the Shanghai summit with President Bush and during the summit itself on Oct. 19-21, Putin made several advances to the U.S. side.

These included a promise to soften the Russian position on the ABM Treaty (Moscow is ready to change some articles of this 1972 accord, if the U.S. agrees not to abandon the treaty unilaterally) and closure of Russian military-spy bases in Vietnam and Cuba.

The Russian side expected some concessions from the U.S. side in exchange: a write-off of the Soviet "lend-lease" debt to the U.S. dating back to World War II; a "green light" for Russian arms exports to Malaysia, Indonesia and Latin America; acceleration of Russia's entrance into the WTO; a write-off of at least several billion dollars from Russia's huge "conventional" foreign debt, surpassing $140 billion; and an increase in Western investment in Russia.

At the same time, Putin demonstrated a firm position on some "principal" items. In particular, he warned Bush that U.S.-Russian relations would deteriorate if the U.S. begins the "execution" of Iraq (whose involvement in the Sept. 11 strikes is rather evident) or Syria.

However, Putin received nothing really substantial from President Bush in Shanghai, which further inflamed the already irritated "military/security" group in Putin's camp. Their major points of discontent are the following:

• Uzbekistan allowed the U.S. to establish several military bases on its territory in exchange for economic assistance of about $10 billion, and Russia appeared to be incapable of stopping this move. Russian domination of Central Asia has thus received a serious threat.

• Even the cautious cooperation of Russia with the U.S. in the Afghan campaign could seriously undermine Russia's position in the Islamic world.

• After the closure of an electronic reconnaissance base on Cuba, Russia lost 70 percent of its electronic intelligence on the U.S.

According to available data, hidden items for military expenses will increase at the same rate or even greater. Especially high growth of expenditures is planned for such items as new weaponry R&D and purchases of new warplanes, helicopters, telecom systems and spy gear for the Russian army.

However, the FSB (a successor to the KGB) is going to get the biggest bonanza.

During the period Oct. 20-Nov. 10, between the Shanghai Summit and Putin's trip to America, Putin began a new shakeup of the Russian government and Kremlin staff.

As expected, this shakeup will result in the dismissal of Railway Minister Aksyonenko, Chief of Customs Commission Vanin, Mass-Media Minister Lesin, and Chief of Kremlin Staff Voloshin. All these top-ranking officials, belonging to the "old Yeltsin guard," would be replaced by "old FSB/KGB cadres," mostly those who worked with Putin in St. Petersburg during the 1990s.

That's not all. The FSB intends to put under its direct or indirect control the Russian Central Bank, as well as Russia's most authoritative newspapers, TV channels and radio stations. The FSB also wants to supervise the entire privatization process and property redistribution in Russia.

These functions would dramatically expand FSB control over finances, the economy and the average citizen's daily life in Russia. Will the FSB succeed? More or less, probably yes. That's because Putin is inclined to support FSB aspirations.

On Nov. 12, just hours before Putin's scheduled departure for the U.S., Sergei Ivanov – Russia's current defense minister and a former high-ranking FSB official – stated that Russia will never send troops, even a limited number of them, to Afghanistan.

Ivanov added that Russia will further upgrade its military bases in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Claims that Russia is greatly reducing its network of military bases abroad do not correspond to reality, he said.

The dominance of the army, police, and FSB in Russia is continuously expanding. According to recent polls, over 70% of Russians do not consider Russia a democracy. Western media and politicians should also give up their "Russian illusions."

Upgrades Ties With 'Traditional Friends'

In late October–early November, the Russian deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, Ilya Klebanov, and some other Russian officials stated that Russian arms exports will surpass $4 billion in 2001 and reach $6 billion in the near future (2002?). He noted that military aircraft constitute most of Russia's current exports, but soon enough the export shift to naval vessels will take place.

Klebanov – and not some "purely economic" minister – accompanied Putin to the APEC forum in Shanghai. Klebanov had a chance to talk with leaders of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese defense industry.

At the same time, Putin exchanged opinions with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and Russian Chief of General Staff Gen. Kvashnin had a series of negotiations with PLA CGS Gen. Fu Quanyou, Defense Minister Gen. Chi Haotian, and Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao.

On Oct. 27, Hu – Jiang's designated successor as Communist Party general secretary, Chinese president and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman – held talks with Putin in the Kremlin. During the talks, both sides confirmed that the 1972 "ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of international stability." Both sides also stressed support for the continuation of an extremely high level of Sino-Russian cooperation.

The conclusion is clear: Regardless of what happens between the U.S. and Russia, cooperation between the Russian army and the PLA will still flourish, the flow of Russian arms and weapon production technology to China will continue to rise, and Russian concessions in regard to the ABM Treaty won't exceed limits permitted by President Jiang.

Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is a consultant to the American Foreign Policy Council. He is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."

Dr. Thomas J. Torda has been a Chinese linguist specializing in science and technology with FBIS, and a Chinese/Russian defense technology consultant with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

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